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In the seven years since the accession of President Vladimir Putin, the FSB 
(Federal Security Service) has mounted a steady campaign designed to 
subsume all of Russia’s intelligence agencies under its command and to re-
create a monolithic, Soviet-style Intelligence agency. The FSB has been largely 
successful: FAPSI (Federal Agency for Government Communications and 
Information, which had been responsible for monitoring and collecting information 
through electronic means), the Border Guards Service and the MVD (Interior 
Ministry) all have been incorporated to one degree or another. As of now, the 
FSB’s lone “failures” are the GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate of the Armed 
Forces), and the SVR (Foreign Intelligence Directorate). In recent weeks, the 
FSB has launched a new campaign for supremacy. 
 
Early this month, the Russian Duma passed a new anti-terrorism bill (first 
introduced in March), allowing the FSB to mount anti-terrorist operations on 
foreign soil. Such legislation was bound to provoke a reaction from the GRU and 
SVR, which view international operations as their exclusive domain. That has 
proven to be the case–and the interagency war may take place in Iraq.  
 
Early in June, four Russian diplomats were kidnapped and killed in Iraq. 
President Vladimir Putin’s response was to order the Security Services to “find 
and destroy” (1) the murderers, an order which FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev 
claimed his agency would make “every effort” to carry out. (2) Patrushev’s 
comments evoked a response both from the SVR and from the military high 
 2 
command. First, Sergei Shestov, CEO of a veterans organization, claimed that 
the SVR’s “Zaslon” commando team would carry out the assassination (3); then, 
General Yuri Baluyevsky, Chief of the General Staff, claimed that GRU Special 
Forces operatives were already in Iraq, attempting to find the killers. (4) It is 
highly unusual for a Chief of Staff to mention GRU (except in the broadest 
possible terms such as in relation to military reforms), let alone to discuss 
specific operations. As such, Baluyevsky’s comments must be viewed both as a 
statement of intent, and as a warning to the FSB to stay out of military matters 
and to confine itself to domestic operations.  
 
Given the timing of the GRU and SVR statements, it is possible that these two 
agencies are working together to successfully carry out the “liquidation order” 
given by President Putin—thus "scooping" the FSB and asserting dominance in 
foreign operations. In this instance at least, “my enemy’s enemy is my friend.” 
The SVR and GRU’s future independence may depend on their success or 
failure. 
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